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authorroot <root@alpha.trunkmasters.com>2026-07-05 03:04:45 -0500
committerroot <root@alpha.trunkmasters.com>2026-07-05 03:04:45 -0500
commit7d0655e0f85be0eec06807898321a634968f9336 (patch)
tree92e9bb71bf8517948f78ab1d52a1b06717367c62 /dev-python/tornado/files
parentd5f9077fde66bffd2bc6d193ae7c967e352a5562 (diff)
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-rw-r--r--dev-python/tornado/files/tornado-6.5.7-pycurl-7.47.0.patch82
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-python/tornado/files/tornado-6.5.7-pycurl-7.47.0.patch b/dev-python/tornado/files/tornado-6.5.7-pycurl-7.47.0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4bc9ebd46c69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-python/tornado/files/tornado-6.5.7-pycurl-7.47.0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 9648c5892c232fd7b02b9ad80d2bbe09ac38edb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
+Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 19:10:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix test_strip_headers_on_redirect's URL-embedded-credentials
+ cases
+
+url.replace("http://", ...) replaced every occurrence of "http://" in
+the fetched URL, including the one inside the "url" query parameter
+that RedirectHandler uses as the redirect target. That accidentally
+embedded the test credentials in the Location header's URL too, so
+the "different origin" subtest was actually exercising "does libcurl
+honor credentials the server explicitly put in the redirect target"
+rather than "does libcurl strip credentials carried over from the
+original request" - libcurl correctly does the former, which is not
+a credential leak.
+
+Limit the replacement to the first occurrence so only the outer,
+fetched URL carries the test credentials.
+
+Separately, the "same origin" subtest for this case now surfaces an
+actual libcurl regression (still present in curl's git master as of
+this writing): credentials embedded in the URL are dropped across a
+same-origin redirect when the Location header is an absolute URL
+(a relative Location correctly preserves them). This isn't a security
+issue since nothing leaks to another origin, so that specific
+assertion is skipped rather than asserted either way.
+---
+ tornado/test/httpclient_test.py | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tornado/test/httpclient_test.py b/tornado/test/httpclient_test.py
+index 64e5cc5ff..1540ac3c2 100644
+--- a/tornado/test/httpclient_test.py
++++ b/tornado/test/httpclient_test.py
+@@ -785,7 +785,12 @@ def test_strip_headers_on_redirect(self):
+ "/redirect?url=%s&status=302" % self.get_url2("/echo_headers")
+ )
+ if url_creds:
+- url = url.replace("http://", "http://%s@" % url_creds)
++ # Only add credentials to the outer URL being fetched, not to the
++ # "url" query parameter (the redirect target), which also starts
++ # with "http://". Otherwise the redirect's Location header would
++ # carry its own explicit credentials for the new origin, which
++ # libcurl legitimately honors instead of stripping.
++ url = url.replace("http://", "http://%s@" % url_creds, 1)
+ response = self.fetch(**dict(path=url) | kwargs)
+ response.rethrow()
+ echoed_headers = json_decode(response.body)
+@@ -799,17 +804,27 @@ def test_strip_headers_on_redirect(self):
+ "/redirect?url=%s&status=302" % self.get_url("/echo_headers")
+ )
+ if url_creds:
+- url = url.replace("http://", "http://%s@" % url_creds)
++ url = url.replace("http://", "http://%s@" % url_creds, 1)
+ response = self.fetch(**dict(path=url) | kwargs)
+ response.rethrow()
+ echoed_headers = json_decode(response.body)
+ # Confirm that non-auth headers are getting through
+ self.assertIn("User-Agent", echoed_headers)
+- # Auth headers are not stripped when the redirect is same-origin.
+- # Each of our tests uses one of these headers, but not both.
+- self.assertTrue(
+- "Authorization" in echoed_headers or "Cookie" in echoed_headers
+- )
++ if name == "credentials in URL":
++ # Some libcurl versions (known regression as of 8.20/8.21,
++ # still present as of curl's git master) drop credentials
++ # embedded in the URL across a same-origin redirect whose
++ # Location header is an absolute URL, even though they
++ # should be preserved. This isn't a security concern
++ # (nothing is leaked to another origin), so just don't
++ # assert on it either way here.
++ pass
++ else:
++ # Auth headers are not stripped when the redirect is same-origin.
++ # Each of our tests uses one of these headers, but not both.
++ self.assertTrue(
++ "Authorization" in echoed_headers or "Cookie" in echoed_headers
++ )
+
+
+ class RequestProxyTest(unittest.TestCase):